An Economic Approach to Hazardous Wastes by Weidenbaum, Murray L
Washington University in St. Louis 
Washington University Open Scholarship 
Murray Weidenbaum Publications Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public Policy 
Occasional Paper 61 
3-1-1987 
An Economic Approach to Hazardous Wastes 
Murray L. Weidenbaum 
Washington University in St Louis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/mlw_papers 
 Part of the Economics Commons, and the Public Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Weidenbaum, Murray L., "An Economic Approach to Hazardous Wastes", Occasional Paper 61, 1987, 
doi:10.7936/K7QC01NG. 
Murray Weidenbaum Publications, https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/mlw_papers/100. 
Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public Policy — Washington University in St. Louis 
Campus Box 1027, St. Louis, MO 63130. 
ANECONONUCAPPROACH 
TO HAZARDOUS WASTES 
by 
Murray L Weidenbaum 
OP61 
March 1987 
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY CAMPUS BOX 1208 ONE BROOKINGS DRIVE ST. LOUIS, MISSOUR163130-4899 
CENTER FOR THE STUDY 
OF AMERICAN BUSINESS 
AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HAZARDOUS WASTES 
by Murray L. Weidenbaum, Director 
Center for the Study of American Business 
Washington University in St. Louis 
An Address to the Annual Chemical Progress Week Luncheon, 
St. Louis, Missouri, March 17, 1987 
OP 61 
AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HAZARDOUS WASTES 
Murray L. Weidenbaum 
Every poll of citizen sentiment in the United States shows overwhelming 
support for doing more to clean up the environment. One public opinion survey by 
The New York Times and CBS News reported that 58 percent agreed with the 
following statement: 
Protecting the environment is so important that requirements 
and standards cannot be too high and continuing environmental 
improvements must be made regardless of cost. 
With such an overwhelming public mandate and a plethora of new laws and 
directives by the Environmental Protection Agency plus tens of billions of dollars 
of compliance costs by private industry, why then are ecology groups and so many 
citizens so unhappy with the results? 
Unfortunately, environmental action is an important example of the failure 
of the American society to follow through on good intentions. Those same citizens 
who want environmental improvements "regardless of cost" are vociferously 
adamant in opposing the location of a hazardous waste facility in their own 
neighborhood. Nor are they too keen on paying for the cleanup. Sure, they are all 
for cleaning up the environment, but why don't you put the dump site in someone 
else's back yard? And why don't you get "them" (meaning the other fellow) to pay 
for it? 
Note: This material is drawn from the author's forthcoming book, The Post 
Reagan Economy (New York, Basic Books, 1988). 
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A sad example is what happened when the enlightened citizens of Minnesota 
received a $3.7 million grant from EPA to build and operate a state-of-the-art 
chemical landfill which could handle hazardous wastes with high assurance of 
safety. In each of the 16 locations that the state checked out, the local residents 
raised such a fuss and howl, that the state government backed off. Ultimately, the 
unspent grant was returned to EPA. 
Unfortunately, the Minnesota experience is not an exceptional case. Since 
1980, not a single major new disposal facility has been sited anywhere in the 
United States. 
This ambivalent attitude toward the environment is nothing new. In the 
early 1970s, the National Wildlife Federation commissioned a national survey to 
ascertain how much people were willing to pay for a cleaner environment. At a 
time of peak enthusiasm for environmental regulation, the public was asked, "To 
stop the pollution destroying our plant life and wildlife, would you be willing to 
pay an increase in your monthly electric bill of $1 ?" The "no" vote won hands 
down, 62% to 28% (with 10% "not sure"). That survey, we should recall, was taken 
before the big runup in utility bills. Perhaps not too surprisingly, the survey 
showed strong support for taxing business to finance environmental cleanup. 
In other words, most Americans very much want a cleaner environment, but 
they are neither willing to pay for it nor even seriously inconvenience themselves. 
They try to take the easy way out -- by imposing the burden on "someone else," 
preferably large impersonal institutions. Meanwhile most of us remain totally 
oblivious to the key role that we as consumers play in this process by continuing to 
demand rising amounts of goods and services whose production and distribution 
generate the great bulk of pollution. Let us try to see how the nation got into this 
policy box and then examine some opportunities for solution. 
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The Environment Policy Problem 
The sad truth is that EPA frequently falls short in meeting congressionally-
mandated goals for pollution cleanup and the number of dangerous dump sites 
filled with overflowing hazardous wastes continues to mount. A cynic might react 
to the mountain of environmental impact statements and regulatory issuances that 
are prepared each year with the plea, "Let us mourn for all the trees that are 
needlessly cut down to meet the paperwork requirements of environmental 
statutes." 
It is too easy for environmental groups to respond to these serious ecological 
problems by blaming them all on neanderthals in the business community who do 
not care about the air we breathe, the water we drink, or the land we live on --
and the EPA for knuckling under to their pressures. Nor is public policy helped 
by the mirror image of that activity -- business executives accusing both EPA and 
environmental groups of not caring a whit about such practical matters as jobs or 
the economy. 
The fact is that the status quo in hazardous waste policy is not working. 
Congress continues to pass high-sounding legislation with unrealistic timetables and 
inflexible deadlines, while EPA gets ever more responsibilities and private industry 
spends billions more on environmental compliance. Meanwhile, serious ecological 
problems worsen. In the words of former administrator Bill Ruckelshaus, "EPA's 
statutory framework is less a coherent attack on a complex and integrated societal 
problem than it is a series of petrified postures." Let us see if there are sensible 
ways out of this policy quandary. 
From my own experience, I am mindful of the fact that virtually any 
change in an environmental statute proposed by an_ economist is viewed as the 
response of a green-eyeshade type devoid of all ecological concerns. Perhaps some 
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modern-day Shakespeare can write the script whereby a reform-minded economist 
convincingly declares, "If I am polluted, do I not cough?" 
Let us turn to the current controversy over the disposal of hazardous wastes. 
Instances of toxic-waste contamination at Love Canal in New York State and at 
Times Beach here in Missouri have brought a great sense of urgency to the 
problem. The public mood on the subject of hazardous waste leaves little room for 
patience -- but much opportunity for emotional responses. The same holds true, to 
a large extent, for the attitude of Congress. 
Turning to dioxin, I feel obliged to note that the most severe reaction 
reported so far by humans is a bad case of chloracne -- which is a severe, acne-like 
skin reaction. The scare stories were typically based on extrapolating from data on 
animal experiments, which is very tricky. For example, the lethal dose of the most 
toxic dioxin (2, 3, 7, 8 TCDD) for hamsters is 5,000 times higher than that for 
guinea pigs. Nevertheless, I readily confess my unwillingness to move to or even 
visit Times Beach and our hearts must go out to those people who have suffered 
such severe psychological and financial damage. 
In trying to avoid the repetition of such situations, EPA has promulgated 
detailed regulations on how polluters must keep track of hazardous wastes and how 
they should dispose of them. Late last year Congress extended and expanded 
Superfund, the program designed to clean up hazardous waste sites. The law will 
require companies and ultimately consumers to pay in $9 billion to the fund over 
the next five years. Despite all this effort and attention, the hazardous waste 
dump problem is little improved over the situation that prevailed before Congress 
passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response and Liability Act in 1980. Let 
us see what can be done to deal with this serious situation. 
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Incentives for Locating Toxic Dumos 
Let us face the main reason for the scarcity of hazardous-waste sites -- the 
"Not in My Backyard" syndrome. Sites for toxic substance disposal have joined 
prisons and mental hospitals as items that the public in general wants, but not too 
close by. 
The fact remains that continued public opposition to virtually every means 
of disposing of toxic substances will inevitably lead to disrupting the manufacture 
of needed products. Unfortunately, this could also lead to more illegal and 
dangerous "midnight dumping" of chemicals wastes and other hazardous materials. 
But the hazardous-waste-disposal problem is not going to disappear unless 
Americans change to less polluting methods of production and consumption. Until 
then, greater understanding is needed on the part of the public and a willingness 
to come to grips with important features of the problems arising from the 
production and use of hazardous substances. We need to look upon environmental 
pollution not as a sinful act, but as an activity costly to society and susceptible to 
economic incentives. 
Dealing with important and continuing national problems inevitably 
involves making hard choices. Of course, it will cost large amounts of money 
(likely in the tens of billions of private and public expenditures in the next 
decade) to meet the society's environmental expectations. But spending money may 
be the easiest part of the problem. Getting people to accept dump sites in their 
neighborhoods is much more difficult. 
The answer surely is not an appeal merely to good citizenship, but to 
common sense and self-interest. In a totalitarian society, people who do not want 
to do something the government desires are simply f_orced to do so. In a free 
society with a market economy, in striking contrast, we offer to pay people to get 
them to do something they otherwise would not want to do. The clearest example 
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in modern times is the successful elimination of the military draft coupled with 
very substantial increases in pay and fringe benefits for voluntarily serving in the 
armed forces. 
We must recognize that citizens as individuals have much to gain by 
opposing hazardous waste facilities that would be located near them. When we 
stop to think about it, it is not fair for society as a whole to benefit from a new 
safe disposal site, but to impose most of the costs (such as depressed property 
value) on the people in the locality. But we also should realize that local resistance 
to dealing with hazardous wastes imposes large costs on society as a whole. After 
all, blocking new waste facilities does not make the problem disappear. To the 
contrary, holding vast quantities of toxic substances in temporary and 
deteriorating storage conditions is no solution. 
But there is a way of reconciling individual interests and community 
concerns. It is economic incentives. Just think about it. The prospect of jobs and 
income for the community encourages many· communities to offer tax holidays and 
other enticements to companies considering the location of a new factory -- which 
often does not exactly improve the physical environment of the region. Under 
present arrangements, however, there is little incentive for the citizens of an area 
to agree to locating a site for hazardous wastes in their vicinity, no matter how 
safe the facility really is. But perhaps some areas would accept such a facility if 
the state government (financed by all of the citizens who will benefit from the 
disposal facility) would pay for a new school building or firehouse or library or 
some other important civic investment desired by the residents of the area adjacent 
to the dump site. After all, unlike an industrial factory, a hazardous waste facility 
provides few offsetting benefits to the local residents in the form of jobs or tax 
revenues. 
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This idea is not as far fetched as it may seem. An episode in 1985 shows 
the promise of the incentive approach. In the rural town of Lisbon, Connecticut, 
an entrepreneur proposed to locate a modern incinerator that would generate both 
energy from waste and $1 million in tax revenues. Despite the financial incentive 
and assurance that the incinerator would be equipped with the latest antipollution 
devices, he was rebuffed. Then the businessman tried another tactic. Instead of 
saying that the new facility would bring the town $1 million a year in additional 
taxes, he promised to pay the property taxes of every landowner in the town for 
the next 25 years. Actually, the total cost would be about the same. But 
individual citizens could appreciate the direct benefits of the second approach. 
Local opposition to the undertaking quickly diminished. A town 
referendum on the incinerator yielded a vote of 680 in favor and 540 opposed. But 
that vote was only advisory. Later on, the town Planning and Zoning Commission 
voted 5 to 4 against the project. The incentive approach, in the case of Lisbon, can 
be described as producing a near miss. Yet the incident does show the latent 
citizen support for making difficult tradeoffs when provided with some reasonable 
-- and in this case imaginative -- alternatives. 
But there is no need to place the entire burden for improving the status quo 
of environmental policy on private citizens. There is much that government can do 
to improve the situation. For example, EPA could reduce the entire hazardous 
waste problem process by distinguishing between truly lethal wastes -- which 
clearly should be disposed of with great care -- and wastes that contain only trace 
or minute amounts of some undesirable materials. To the extent that changes in 
legislation would be required, the agency should urge Congress to make them. 
Public policy needs to take account of the fact that levels of some 
substances can now be measured by the EPA in terms of parts per quadrillion. 
That means that many of the scare headlines about chemical health hazards are 
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akin to searching for the proverbial needle in the haystack. Actually, the needle-
haystack comparison is much too modest. One part per billion is just one inch in 
16,000 miles, a second in 32 years, a penny in $10 million, or four drops of water 
in an Olympic-sized pool. 
A recent EPA report concludes that the agency's current priorities "do not 
correspond well" with its rankings by risk of the various ecological problems that it 
is dealing with. Thus, the agency's own study found several areas of high risk but 
little regulatory effort. A key example is the runoff of polluted water from farms 
and city streets. 
Conversely, areas of "high EPA effort but relatively low risks" included 
management of hazardous wastes, cleanup of chemical waste dumps, regulation of 
underground storage tanks containing petroleum or other hazardous substances, and 
municipal solid waste. The reason for this mismatch between needs and resources 
is obvious. EPA's priorities are set by Congress and reflect public concerns more 
than scientific knowledge. 
The results of this mismatch are substantial. After all, not all hazards are 
created equal. At present, it is likely that some disposal sites are being filled with 
innocuous material while truly dangerous substances are, or will be -- for lack of 
space-- dumped illegally or stored "temporarily." What is needed is more 
widespread application of the legal concept known as de minimis non curant lex --
the law does not concern itself with trifles. 
Back in 1979, a federal circuit court supported the view that there is a de 
minimis level of risk too small to affect human health adversely. That doctrine 
was cited in turning down the claim that some "migration" of substances occurred 
from food-packaging films and food-contact articles. More recently, in 1985, the 
FDA concluded that using methylene chloride to extract caffeine from coffee 
presented a de minimis risk. Hence, the substance is safe for its intended use. 
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Just this past December, Professor Bruce Ames of the University of 
California at Berkeley spoke out on this subject -- he is the inventor of the Ames 
test, widely used to identify chemicals that might be carcinogens (i.e., cancer 
causing). Here is a direct quote: 
We do want rules about pollution, but I'm not sure we should 
be spending enormous amounts of money getting that last part per 
billion out of the water supply when there's really no evidence that 
it is doing any harm ... 
A Birth Control Approach to Pollution 
Over 99 percent of federal and state environmental spending is devoted to 
controlling pollution after waste is generated. Less than 1 percent is spent to 
reduce the generation of waste. Moreover, many current pollution control methods 
often do little more than move waste around. For example, air and water pollution 
control devices typically generate solid, hazardous waste that goes to landfills and 
often leach from there into groundwater. 
Clearly, the most desirable approach is to reduce the generation of 
hazardous wastes in the first place. Again, economists have developed some 
concepts that are useful. The way to do that is to provide adequate incentives to 
manufacturers to change their production processes to reduce the amount of wastes 
created or to recycle them in a safe and productive manner. Further, to the extent 
that hazardous ·wastes must be generated, government should make their proper 
treatment or disposal a relatively easy matter rather than an extraordinarily 
difficult one. Measured against these two objectives, the current legal framework 
is not as good as it could be. 
Under recent amendments to the federal "Superfund" law, clean ups are 
financed with a combination of taxes levied on producers of chemical "feedstocks" 
and petroleum, a surtax on the earnings of large manufacturing companies, and 
contributions from the Treasury. Thousands of serious disposers who do not 
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happen to be in the chemical or oil business wind up paying much less than 
comparable disposers in those two targeted industries. Similarly, large 
manufacturers may pay disproportionately more if they have high revenues and 
low waste generation. The problem is that we now tax producers rather than 
polluters. By doing that, we are missing a real opportunity to curb the actual 
dumping of dangerous waste. 
A basic correction is needed in that major piece of environmental 
legislation called the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (or "Superfund"). Conceptually, switching to a waste-end fee levied 
on the amount of hazardous-wastes that a company actually generates and disposes 
of would be far more economically sound than taxing the amount of production. 
(I) It would provide an incentive to reduce the actual output of waste. Some 
companies would find it cheaper to change their production process than to pay 
the tax. (2) It would promote development of recycling and reuse systems. (3) It 
would cover the products produced overseas which are now disposed of in our 
country tax free. In short, rewriting the Superfund law so that it is more fair 
would also help protect the environment -- and would probably save money. 
More companies are recycling as they become increasingly aware of the 
business possibilities and the economic benefits. Let me give you a few examples. 
One chemical firm burns 165,000 tons of coal a year at one of its textile fiber 
factories. That generates 35,000 tons of waste in the form of flyash. The company 
recently found a local cement-block company that was testing flyash as a 
replacement for limestone in making lightweight cement blocks. The chemical 
company now sells the flyash to the cement block manufacturer. What has been an 
undesirable waste by-product ~as been turned into a commercially useful material. 
Simultaneously, the companies are conserving the supply of limestone. 
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In another industry, a timber company through its research developed a new 
use for tree bark. That is the last massive waste product of the wood products 
industry. The firm designed a bark processor that made it the first domestic 
producer of vegetable wax, an important ingredient in cosmetics and polishes. Yet 
another case of constructive recycling is furnished by the manufacturing practices 
of a chemical plant in Illinois. It had been creating a veritable sea of calcium 
fluoride sludge (at the rate of 1,000 cubic yards a month) as a by-product of its 
manufacture of fluorine-based chemicals. The company found that the sludge 
could be mixed with another waste product to produce synthetic fluorspar, which 
it had been buying from other sources. Recycling the two waste products now 
saves the firm about $1 million a year. 
Incentives to do more along these lines could be provided in several 
different ways. The least desirable is to subsidize the producers to follow the 
desired approach. In this period of large budget deficits, that would, of course, 
increase the amount of money that the Treasury must borrow. 
A more promising alternative is to put a stiff tax on the generation and 
disposal of hazardous wastes. The object would not be to punish the polluters but 
to get them to change their ways. If something becomes more expensive, business 
firms have a natural desire to use less of the item~ In this case, the production of 
pollution (specifically, hazardous wastes) would become more expensive. Every 
sensible firm would then try to reduce the amount of pollution tax it pays by 
curbing its hazardous wastes. Care needs to be taken to make such a tax workable 
and to guard against more "illegal dumping" by generators in an effort to avoid the 
tax. 
Adjusting to new taxes on pollution would not be a I?atter of patriotism but 
of cost minimization and hence profit maximization. The pollution tax approach 
appeals to self-interest in order to achieve the public interest. Many economists 
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have long advocated "taxing" pollution through effluent fees as a more efficient 
alternative to the current regulatory system. They argue that charging polluters 
for the pollution they cause increases incentives for companies to find innovative 
ways to decrease their discharges. 
These fees would have the effect of raising costs and hence prices for 
products whose production generates a lot of pollution. Consumer demand would 
tend to shift to products which pollute less. In order to stay competitive, high-
polluting producers would have to economize on pollution, just as they would on 
any other costly factor of production. Since pollution imposes burdens on the 
environment, it is only fair that the costs of cleaning up that pollution should be 
reflected in the price of a product whose production generates this burden. 
The Public Sector Drags Its Heels 
A word of caution: we should avoid falling into a common trap -- that of 
associating polluters exclusively with business. To be sure, many companies do 
generate lots of toxic waste and not all of them handle it properly. But the same 
can be said about government agencies, hospitals, schools and universities. 
Moreover, EPA lacks the enforcement power over the public sector that it possesses 
over the private sector. Reports of plant closings due to the high cost of meeting 
environmental standards are common. The "lost opportunity" cost for the plant not 
built, or the expansion not made, is probably higher still. In contrast, there is no 
record of a government agency or even of a single government facility closing 
down for the same reason. 
It therefore is not surprising that the General Accounting Office says that 
federal agency performance in carrying out the requirements of hazardous waste 
disposal "has not been exemplary." In fact, a GAO report issued late last year says 
that, of 72 federal facilities inspected, 33 were in violation of EPA requirements; 
and 22 had been cited for Class 1 (serious) violations. Sixteen of the 33 facilities 
. .. 
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remained out of compliance for six months or more. Three had not been in 
compliance for more than three years. 
A major offender is the Department of Defense which now generates more 
than 500,000 tons of hazardous waste a year. That is more than the five largest 
chemical companies combined. 
The federal government does not set a good example in terms of its 
compliance with its own environmental directives. It expects the private sector to 
take environmental concerns far more seriously than it does itself. The point is 
not to let anyone off the hook. The preferred solution is quite obvious: what is 
sauce for the goose should also be sauce for the gander. 
Regulation Is a Consumer Issue 
Let me return to my main theme. Environmental economics makes for 
strange alliances. So far, business interests have opposed the suggestions of 
economists for sweeping changes in the basic structure of government regulation 
such as using taxes on pollution. After all, despite the shortcomings of the present 
system of government regulation, many firms have paid the price of complying 
with existing rules. Firms have learned to adjust to regulatory requirements and to 
integrate existing regulatory procedures into their long-term planning. 
In developing public support for regulatory reform, it is vital to distinguish 
between the self-serving objective of merely reducing the burdens on business and 
the enlightened attitude of adopting more efficient and more effective modes of 
regulation. As long as regulatory changes are seen as primarily a problem for 
business, there will be limited public support for the kinds of reform that I have 
been advocating. I must admit that I share the public attitude that business 
executives are paid to deal with difficult problems, including the ones that arise in 
complying with regulation. 
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But reforming regulation is truly a consumer issue. It is the consumer who 
receives the benefits from regulation and who ultimately bears the burden of the 
costs of compliance in the form of higher prices and less product variety. Thus it 
is the consumer who has the key stake in improving the current environmental 
regula tory morass. 
At first blush, economics and ecology may seem to be poles apart. But when 
we consider economic analysis to be a way of dealing with difficult problems of 
choice -- rather than a mere green eyeshade approach -- we can see how using some 
basic economic concepts can help to achieve our important environmental 
objectives. 
